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Following is composite of Governing Mayor Brandt's publicly and privately stated views on Berlin Situation and Related Subjects:

(1) Soviet notes and statements: Soviet "Free City" proposal entirely unacceptable. It would expose a "Danzig-on-Spree" to pressure of Soviet military divisions ranged around Berlin and clearly aims at absorption West Berlin into GDR. Proposal for independent "Free City" monetary unit equally unacceptable. Economic unity with Federal Republic forms basis of existence free Berlin. Brandt also rejects creation of free city composed of East and West Berlin on grounds that it would be incapable of survival on basis Soviet "paper guarantees". If united Berlin could, however, be linked to FedRep by extraterritorial corridor without any GDR controls and City could have adequate international guarantees, some such plan might offer basis for discussion.

Brandt inclines to look for "escape hatch" in Sov position through which solution Berlin problem might be found and continually emphasizes that even slightest opening in Sov position must be probed. Although he apt give initially somewhat optimistic interpretation to any remarks by Soviets which could be construed as retreats from their hard maximum position, he has so far not been able to detect any "escape hatch" in any of the USSR's tactical gyrations on Berlin or Germany.

Brandt has expressed belief that until early 1958 Soviets not particularly concerned with Berlin question and that until summer or fall they exercised retarding influence on Ulbricht group. Possibly due to urging by East Germans or for other policy considerations, he thinks they decided in fall 1958 to utilize Berlin question as lever to set into motion negotiations with the West re German problem and/or other questions (European security) while retaining for themselves the option of reverting to pursuit of purely local (Berlin) objectives at any time if agreement on larger issues not reached.

(2) Western Policy: Brandt considers Western presence in Berlin (especially U.S. determination maintain its position) as foremost element in maintenance Berlin's freedom; unimpeded access for Western

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garrisons is inseparable concept by West in Berlin. He maintains that application of "agent theory" involving West's own submission to GDR controls would be beginning of end of free Berlin. He believes that the West should use force, if necessary, to maintain West's status, but no longer emphasizes that view, probably in realization it would be difficult to maintain control from West policy decisions currently in stage of policy.

Brandt considers absolutely vital that he retain ability and determined rejection Soviet effort to alter reality, that would change the Berlin situation. Negotiations must not take place under pressure of Soviet ultimatum. Beyond that, he thinks West ought to develop initiative in its own and keep making suggestions to throw Soviets off balance. One way to do this might be to re-examine existing 1949 agreements on Berlin, west submit plans for improving Berlin agreements, including those on access, to eliminate doubtful and dangerous situation from world politics.

(3) Re relation Berlin problem to larger questions (reunification, European security), Brandt feels Berlin issue might be solved in context larger solutions but strongly cautions against connecting Berlin with other issues to such an extent that inability solve reunification-security problems will completely stymie progress re Berlin. West must be prepared, if necessary, to "untie the package and place Berlin question alone on conference table." In that case, however, West must not accept any changes in status of Berlin.

(4) Possible Blockade. Brandt has continuously struck sober note that chief test of nerves for Berlin and West Berlin could yet to come. From the beginning of Berlin crisis the city's economic situation has concerned him as much as the political because of long-range consequences and possible irreversibility of unfavorable economic trends. Although cognizant that immediate Soviet threat directed primarily against western areas, he has frequently implied that Soviet success in "cutting one slice off Berlin" will lead to cutting of other slices and eventually to Berlin's economic strangulation. This reasoning was initially responsible for his statement that maintenance of land routes absolutely vital and that force must be used if necessary to keep them open because in long run it impossible maintain reasonably smooth working economy in blockade situation (Berlin's 484 to Bonn, 547 SecState); he fears economic uncertainties would lead to cancellation of orders and investments and to virtually intolerable unemployment situation. Of late, however, Brandt has taken more positive economic aspects, such as Berlin's ability to resist, existence of large reserves, and has expressed confidence in city's improved preparedness to survive under blockade conditions.

(5) UN participation in Berlin blockade. While Brandt considers it important that UN be fully aware of Berlin development, he has repeatedly stated that UN not competent in German questions unless Berlin becomes problem endangering peace. He feels proposal moving UN broadpowers to Berlin impractical but has expressed

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view that UN might be more responsive to allies toward Berlin, these, however, can never replace basic Western abilities or Western Allies.

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(6) Technical Contacts between East and West Germany. Brandt is not optimistic that technical contacts would lead to an improvement of all-German situation although he is record as favoring that the experiences gained in Interzonal trade be utilized for making "practical arrangements" in other fields; however, he has stressed that his own experience in negotiation; that improvements be made in communications between East and West Berlin was not encouraging. In an interview with Der Spiegel (Feb 4 issue) he stated his belief that some West German ideas on technical contacts future structure; it is impossible to demand that Western powers adhere to a firm position re Berlin while on the other hand advocating measures tending to undermine that position.

(7) Confederation between East and West Germany. Brandt stated it essential determine whether Moscow wants by confederation a transition, in any way toward reunification or a consolidation of Germany's division. He feels it dangerous to believe that Bonn and Pankow can solve problems which cannot be solved at their level.

(8) Demilitarization. Brandt has stated that Germans must not be severed from Western community; only such solutions of security question are acceptable to him which would not weaken total position of West. Problem is to bring about changes of Western policy in this first work.

Brandt has refused to speculate whether decision to arm Bundeswehr with atomic weapons was one of causes of Soviet political offensive against Berlin. He stressed he much more concerned with Soviet atomic threats. However, he has stated he would welcome it if, based on Geneva talks or other negotiations, "atomic armament would not spread" and Germans could avoid it. Press reports that Brandt stated in Jan 24 telecast that revised Topachki plan could be, among other proposals, a basis for discussion." No transcript his remarks available here but his Press Chief told Mission that his emphasis was on idea of getting East-West discussions going and that West, of course, should submit its own proposals at some time.

(9) Status of Berlin. Brandt has repeatedly stated there no evidence that Soviet moves against Berlin in any way connected with West Berlin's integration with legal, currency, and economic system of Fedrep. He feels that if in period 1949-1952 Berlin status as Federal Land had been strengthened (while guarding supreme responsibility of Western Allies), Berlin would today not only enjoy Western guarantees, but may have against Berlin would be more against entirety of non-communist Germany to much greater degree than is case now.

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JOHN F. DUNN, JR.

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